On May 16^th, the Brazil, Ministry of Agriculture reported a confirmed outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in a broiler breeder farm with 17,000 birds located in the Municipality of Montenegro in the state of Rio Grande do Sul.  The farm concerned  Is contracted to Vibera Foods that has an association with Tyson Foods. The farm was rapidly depopulated and eggs were retrieved from hatcheries in the state in addition to facilities in Minas Gerais and Parana states.

The outbreak occurred concurrently with a diagnosis in a bird sanctuary in Sapucaia do Sul, approximately 30 miles from the index case. It is presumed that this facility with a lake and the index farm were infected  concurerently by migratory birds rather than by direct or indirect contact. Brazil has reported numerous diagnoses of avian influenza H5N1 in migratory birds along the Atlantic littoral but prior to the present report the infection has not occurred in commercial flocks. 

Predictably the report resulted in importing nations imposing embargos that will impact exports over the short term but may have longer term implications for both Brazil and world broiler trade if additional cases emerge or are disclosed especially if in multiple states. At the outset, the U.S. broiler industry should refrain from Schadenfreude, that unique Teutonic characteristic of deriving pleasure in someone else’s misfortune.  Brazil expects to resume exports in the near future since many customer nations are imposing only limited localized embargos and will follow the World Organization of Animal Health (WOAH) limitation of 28 days following completion of decontamination. Despite an optimistic statement from the USA Poultry and Egg Export Council concerning acquisition of new markets, U.S. integrators are currently unable to supply the whole birds and other products exported by Brazil.

Investigations subsequent to the Rio Grande do Sul outbreak failed to confirm HPAI in commercial farms located in Ipumirim in Santa Catarina and in Aguiarnopolis in Tocantins state. In addition a number of backyard flocks have yielded negative results.

To place the importance of Brazil in perspective, production in Brazil during 2025 will attain 15,250 million metric tons representing 14.4 percent of world output of 105.8 million metric tons, excluding feet. Production in Brazil is approximately 70 percent of projected U.S. output of 21.7 million metric tons.

Domestic consumption in Brazil will attain10.17 million metric tons in 2025, equivalent to a per capita value of 47.9 kg. assuming a population of 212 million.  According to USDA estimates, Brazil will export 5.3 million metric tons comprising a diverse range of RTC products in 2025 representing 37 percent of world trade and 1.7 times the volume of U.S. exports of 3.3 million metric tons, with 97 percent as leg quarters.  In 2024 Brazil exported 5.3 million metric tons valued at $9.94 billion at a unit price of $1,878 per ton.  In comparison the U.S. exported 3.3 million metric tons valued at $4.8 billion equivalent to a unit price of $1,459 per metric ton, reflecting a preponderance of relatively low-value leg quarters.

Exports of poultry products from Brazil including fertile eggs, breeding stock and RTC could be severely impacted given initial nationwide embargos by China, the E.U. and South Korea. Some nations recognizing their respective needs for chicken from Brazil have imposed state or regional embargos including Japan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among 17 nations.

The potential for disruption in trade from Brazil can be judged by 2024 exports:

During the first quarter of 2023 neighbors of Brazil including Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Peru and Ecuador reported HPAI, strain H5N1 in wild birds, backyard flocks and some commercial farms.  In addition, Peru reported the death of over 1,000 sea lions and more than 65,000 migratory marine birds.  At this time, Brazil announced that suspect cases of HPAI in Rio Grande do Sul and Amazonas states were negative for the pathogen.  Producers in Brazil implemented extreme biosecurity measures to prevent infection, given the probability of introduction of the disease into commercial flocks by migratory birds following the pattern in north and central America and also in Asia and Africa.  By May 15^th 2023, Brazil had diagnosed 139 cases of HPAI in wild birds and subsistence poultry but inexplicably not on commercial farms as defined by the World Organization of Animal Health.

Carlos Favaro, the Minister of Agriculture for Brazil announced an emergency program to combat HPAI in August 2023 as a result of the extensive infection among migratory birds.  This was in recognition that any outbreak of HPAI in a commercial flock would trigger national, regional or state bans on shipments by importers including China and middle-East nations.

Brazil has remained free of reported avian influenza until the recently disclosed outbreak.

In mid-July 2024, Brazil suspended exports of all poultry products following mortality on a single table-egg production farm that was eventually diagnosed as velogenic, viscerotropic Newcastle disease (END) acquired following contact with wild birds.  After prompt depopulation and appropriate quarantine measures with surveillance, exports resumed with corresponding assurances to importers.  At the time it was questioned whether the specific case was in fact END since response to this infection would have been the same as an isolated case of HPAI. 

Brazil has a history of withholding information on diseases which may impact exports.  This is exemplified by Tom Vilsack, then USDA Secretary of Agriculture, addressing a formal letter to the Government of Brazil requiring improvement in detection and reporting of bovine spongiform encephalopathy. He stated “I urge Brazil in the strongest terms to continue its progress in streamlining timely animal disease reporting.”  The admonition by the USDA followed delays in reporting BSE with two cases of atypical infection diagnosed without prompt notification to the WOAH or importers.  Punitive import restrictions were imposed by trading partners on beef from Brazil following the revelation leading to the rejection of 140,000 metric tons of beef valued at $20 billion.  The fact that Brazil repeatedly failed to report cases of BSE raises the question of HPAI in commercial flocks.  The seven nations surrounding Brazil have reported H5N1 infection in free-living birds, backyard flocks or commercial farms but Brazil has only acknowledged extensive infection in migratory birds.

Conclusions can be derived from the most recent report of HPAI in a commercial flock in Brazil with implications for world trade:-

• HPAI is a panornitic occurring on all inhabited continents and including the Antarctic, affecting marine mammals and birds.  Accordingly, the question of “freedom” from highly pathogenic avian influenza and self-serving attempts to discriminate against exporters reporting localized or regional outbreaks is considered as factious.

• Avian influenza strain H5N1, clade 2.3.4.4b is endemic among migratory marine birds some species of which die of infection and others remain clinically unaffected carriers and disseminators of the pathogen.  Interaction among migratory marine birds and waterfowl through cohabitation on waterways and along coastal areas creates the risk of infection for susceptible commercial flocks.  Given that the pathogen can be transmitted by the aerogenous route over distances that may exceed one mile, even the most stringent biosecurity measures cannot assure absolute protection.

• The patchwork arrangement of trade agreements specifying embargos on entire nations, states or provinces or even regions are generally unjustified especially when importing nations report cases of HPAI in wild birds and free-living mammals and in their own commercial flocks.

• It is possible with PCR technology to confirm whether flocks of origin for exports are free of infection at the time of harvest allowing for certification under WOAH guidelines. 

• Given the geographic extent of both Brazil and the U.S. as the major exporting nations, imposition of countrywide bans is based either on ignorance of the epidemiology of HPAI or the misapplication of phytosanitary regulations to protect local industries.

• Despite the regularly updated recommendation of WOAH, there is an evident lack of uniformity in both adoption and recognition of diagnostic standards, certification and export regulations.  A point in question is compliance with the 28-day period following flock depopulation and decontamination following an outbreak of HPAI or END.  Some nations impose a 60-day embargo and in the case of China resumption of trade may be delayed for years. Harmonization and compliance with scientific standards is overdue.

• The overwhelming lesson from the ongoing panornitic, in progress since 2022, is that current methods of prevention are inadequate given the epidemiology of the infection.  Accordingly, the WOAH acceptance of preventive vaccination should be more extensively applied as an adjunct to biosecurity. Administration of commercially available effective vaccines should establish immune populations and would reduce inter-farm spread within a given area and will absolutely reduce expenditure on depopulation with accompanying indemnity.

Avian influenza should be regarded as the Newcastle disease of the 2020s.  During the 1970s END was in every way as catastrophic as HPAI and the infection is effectively suppressed in nations where a high level of immunity is achieved through diligent vaccination.